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Gatekeeping: An Enhanced Foundational
Approach to Determining the Admissibility
of Scientific Evidence
by
CHARLES NESSON" AND JOHN DEMERS**
Verdict, veritatem dicere, to speak truth. It is the outcome of
the law's process for reaching the truth-the jury trial. The credibil-
ity of the law depends upon the credibility of verdicts, which in turn
depends upon whether society sees verdicts as well-grounded in evi-
dence.1 Thus, the best way in which to preserve the credibility of the
legal system is for judges to insist upon evidence sufficient to support
the conclusions that jurors are permitted to draw. This is the respon-
sibility and the goal of the judges' "gatekeeping" function. If judges
perform this function effectively, only disputes well-grounded in evi-
dence will be resolved by jury verdict, and the legal system will re-
main a credible source of truth.
Nowhere is the role of the judge as gatekeeper more important
or more difficult to perform than in trials requiring conclusions based
on scientific evidence. In such trials, the law, as a source of social
truth, has a powerful rival-science. Science has its own methodol-
ogy for reaching the truth, the scientific method. This methodology
has powered our technological progress. It commands great public
respect and is enforced by the process of peer review. Additionally,
such trials often involve large, well-known corporations, high poten-
tial liability, and tragic health circumstances. Thus, these cases are
widely reported, making glaringly visible verdicts that may be at odds
with the conclusions of science.
Law and science increasingly focus on the same questions: Does
autoimmune disease spring from silicone breast implants? Does
Bendectin cause birth defects? Does trichloroethlyene, vaporized in
* William F. Weld Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks are owed to
Roger Park who organized this conference of Evidence scholars in September 1997, enti-
tled Truth and Its Rivals at which I presented some of the ideas discussed in this Article. I
am grateful to Roger for his brilliantly focusing title, for assembling an extraordinary set
of colleagues to offer their insights, and then, for letting the conference take its course. I
would also like to thank MirJan Damaka, Ronald J. Allen, Kim Lane Scheppele, and
Richard 0. Lempert.
** J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 1999; A.B., College of the Holy Cross,
1993.
1. See generally Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and
the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357 (1985).
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shower water and breathed in by pregnant women, blight babies with
leukemia? On questions such as these, if jury verdicts contradict
those of science, the law lacks any appearance of speaking the truth.
A trial that fails to produce social conviction fails one of its essential
functions: "reestablishing social peace in the wake of a breach."-
Therefore, to enhance law's ability to produce accurate and socially
convincing determinations, the law should borrow from the peer re-
view process of science to formulate an enhanced foundational ap-
proach to assessing the admissibility of scientific evidence.
I' have had experience with the admission of scientific evidence
from both sides, plaintiff and defense. In the mid-1980s, I repre-
sented the plaintiffs as co-counsel with Jan Schlichtmann and others
in the Woburn, Massachusetts toxic tort case chronicled by Jonathan
Harr in A Civil Action.' My role in that case was to ensure that the
scientific evidence that the plaintiffs planned to offer on causation
was solid enough in form and substance to justify a verdict. I never
got that chance. The trial judge bifurcated the case, thereby denying
the plaintiffs their right ever to appear and make their claim in court.
With the trial stripped of its human context and focused on questions
of geology and groundwater flow, the defense could (and did) benefit
enormously from dragging it out. Following their closing statement
after months of tedium litigating Stage I of the bifurcated trial, the
defendants effectively left the jury the choice between either deciding
for the plaintiffs and being forced to return to the jury box for Stage
II and another six months, or deciding for the defendants and going
home.
Even so, the plaintiffs had a chance. In Stage I of the trial, the
jury was to decide whether the solvents dumped on the defendants'
property reached the plaintiffs' drinking wells. We lost this stage of
the trial in part because the judge allowed the defense full latitude in
using junk science. For instance, soil chemist Olin Braids testified
that he had been able to date the contamination of the land with tri-
chloroethylene by the presence of a related chemical compound in
the soil created by the breakdown of the trichloroethylene. From this
he concluded that the chemical ingested by plaintiffs could not have
come from the defendants.' The judge admitted this testimony de-
2. Charles Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Founda-
tional Testing and Corroboration under the Confrontation Clause. 81 VA. L. REV. 149. 150
(1995).
3. All first person references throughout this Article refer to Charles Nesson.
4. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995). The case involved the claim that
trichloroethylene from the defendants' property had leaked into the plaintiffs' water sup-
ply and had caused leukemia. The parties settled the case in 1986 at the conclusion of the
first phase of the jury trial, after five months of testimony.
5. See id. at 344-45.
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spite the fact that Braids could not describe the mechanism by which
he claimed microorganisms broke down trichloroethylene, that he
had never previously done work on microbiology and the degrada-
tion of chemicals, and that he testified that this method of dating con-
tamination may never have been done before.6 A trial with a judge
acting as a more vigilant gatekeeper might have meant a victory for
the plaintiffs.
In the early 1990s, I was co-counsel for the defense in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' in the United States Supreme
Court. In Daubert, the Court articulated the "gatekeeping" idea,
stating that the role of judges is to "ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."9
With respect to expert scientific testimony, the Court charged judges
not only with determining the adequacy of expert credentials"0 and
the relevance of the expert's conclusion to the issues at trail,11 but
also the adequacy of the expert's foundation, that is "whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and... whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue."" In effect, the Court directed that an
expert opinion not based on "a reliable foundation"'3 is "subjective
belief or unsupported speculation,"'4 and should be excluded.
The Court, in accordance with the positions of both petitioners
and respondents, agreed that the "general acceptance" standards for
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence had been super-
seded by passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence.6 But what the
new standard should be remained an open question. On this ques-
6. See id. at 345-46.
7. The other counsel were Charles Fried, Joel Klein, and Richard Taranto.
8. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
9. Id. at 589.
10. See id. at 592 n.10 ("Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a per-
son to be a witness... shall be determined by the court .... " (quoting FED. R. EVID.
104(a)).
11. See id. at 591.
12. Id. at 592-93.
13. Id. at 597. Reliable evidence is defined as that which is "based on scientifically
valid principles." Id.
14. Id. at 590.
15. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
16. See FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."). The Court also reasoned that
the "rigid 'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of
the Federal Rules and their 'general approach to relaxing the traditional barriers to
"opinion" testimony."' Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,
488 U.S. 153,169 (1988)).
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tion, the Court in Daubert adopted the position that co-counsel and I
had advanced: that expert scientific opinions must be solidly
grounded, and that judges must make this foundational judgment as
part of their gatekeeping responsibility to admit good evidence and
exclude speculation.' Having given judges the responsibility to en-
sure the reliability of verdicts, the Court, in the voice of Justice
Blackmun, turned the puzzle of how to do this over to lower court
judges,'8 subject to a significant constraint and an important warning
from the dissent. First, although the decision elaborates the impor-
tant gatekeeping function of judges, it leaves to the jury a large
role-a role that limits what the judge can decide. Judges, in assess-
ing the foundation for scientific expert opinion, must confine them-
selves to judging the expert's methodology, not his conclusions.
This constraint is consistent with the jury's traditional province of
judging the credibility of witnesses and the evidence on ultimate is-
sues. Second, Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent, admonished judges
not to "become amateur scientists in order to perform [their gate-
keeping] role."2
The Daubert opinion, both majority and dissent, beautifully
states its goal and lays down its constraints while expressing a strong
faith in the creative imagination of the judiciary to find solutions to
the difficult problem of assessing the reliability of scientific evidence.
The Justices charted a direction rather than a clear-cut path, confi-
dently placing the task of working out the contours and the details of
this "flexible' inquiry in the hands of the appellate courts, academic
commentators, and, most importantly, the trial court judges who will
fulfill the gatekeeping function.2
Through the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Har-
vard Law School, 3 of which I am director, I initiated a series of semi-
17. See id. at 589. In discussing the tests for admissibility of evidence, the Court
cited to my evidence textbook. See id. at 585 (citing ERIC D. GREEN & CHARLES R.
NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 649 (1983)).
18. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. The Court did suggest some factors for the trial
courts to consider, including whether a scientific theory can be and has been tested.
whether it has been subjected to peer review, and whether the theory is generally ac-
cepted. See id. at 593-94.
19. See id. at 595. "The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodol-
ogy, not on the conclusions that they generate." Id.
20. Id. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part): see also
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 520 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (pointing
out that "judges are not scientists and do not have the scientific training that can facilitate
the making of such decisions").
21. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
22. See id. at 593. "We are confident that federal judges possess the capacity to un-
dertake this review." Id.
23. For more information on the Center and its Daubert Project, see
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nars2 with trial judges to promote discussion and understanding of
these issues in the state courts.25 Our purpose has been to work out
the answer to the Supreme Court's puzzle: How do judges evaluate
the foundation for a scientist's expert opinion without assessing its
conclusions or the credibility of the expert and without becoming
amateur scientists?
The enhanced foundational approach here described helps an-
swer this question. The approach is consistent with the idea that the
law should heed the methodology and forms of science in order to
maintain its credibility in reaching accurate conclusions regarding
scientific evidence. It is encapsulated in a simple rule:
At the discretion of the judge, a party may be ordered to require
its expert witnesses to submit the theoretical or methodological
foundation of their testimony to the court prior to trial in the form of
an article submitted for peer review.
This approach derives from traditional judicial roles, existing
procedural requirements, and the Supreme Court's decisions in Dau-
bert and General Electric Co. v. Joiner.26 First, the approach springs
from the judicial tradition of "gatekeeping"-the assessment of the
reliability and relevance of the evidence a jury hears. This gate-
keeping responsibility includes scrutinizing the proof in proportion to
its importance, i.e., gauging the degree of foundation required to the
weight of the case to be built upon the evidence. Second, the en-
hanced foundational approach builds on the existing requirement of
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that experts prepare
written reports "of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and rea-
sons therefor [as well as] the data or other information considered by
the witness in forming the opinions."'27 Finally, this approach follows
closely the Supreme Court's decisions in Daubert and Joiner, speci-
fying how the judge is to act as an active and vigilant gatekeeper. In
borrowing from science in order to help the judge evaluate science,
this approach fits well with Daubert's emphasis on and repeated ref-
erences to the scientific method.' In fact, Daubert explicitly sug-
gested that the trial judge, in assessing the foundation of the evi-
http://cyber.harvard.edu/daubert.html.
24. Thus far, support for these seminars has come primarily from corporate sources.
A funding request to the plaintiffs' bar was turned down.
25. Many state courts use a Daubert-type approach in assessing the admissibility of
scientific evidence. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d
549 (Tex. 1995).
26. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997) (holding that a district court's determination of admissibil-
ity of evidence under Daubert is reviewable only for abuse of discretion).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
28. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (In Rule 702 "the adjective 'scientific' implies a
grounding in the methods and procedures of science."); see also id. at 594-95 (linking "sci-
entific validity" with "evidentiary relevance and reliability").
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dence, consider "whether the theory or technique has been subjected
to peer review and publication. 2 9
Judges could make the determination to require an enhanced
expert report either on their own initiative or following the request of
one of the parties. A stringent documentary demonstration of foun-
dation would not be appropriate or necessary for every expert at
every trial. But in those cases where expert testimony is introduced
to build the legal equivalent of a skyscraper, it is not unreasonable to
ask experts to spell out their methodology and basis for their scien-
tific conclusions. In making this decision, the judges would likely
consider such factors as the importance of the scientific theory in the
context of the dispute; the magnitude of the health and financial im-
plications of the trial; the degree to which the expert's testimony is
scientifically controversial; and the expense to the parties and the
court.
Following submission by the expert, the judges would assess the
form and foundation of the report to ensure, as per Daubert, that the
evidence is both relevant and reliable.3" The submission would have
the form of a traditional peer review article 31 -including methods,
data, analysis, and references-and would be as extensive and com-
prehensive as one submitted for peer review.32 In order to be credible
to a well-informed audience, the report should be crafted efficiently
to respect the methods and analysis of the particular scientific field in
which the evidentiary issue lies.
The expert's submission is to be anonymous so as to leave the
assessment of the witness's credibility to the jury. Again, this ap-
proach borrows from science, where there has been much discussion
of having articles peer reviewed only after stripping them of informa-
tion which would identify their author. With the author's identity
removed from the report, judges would assess the credentials of the
expert separate from evaluating the adequacy of the basis for the ex-
pert's opinion. Once judges certify the witness as an expert and de-
termine that the basis for the expert's opinion is adequate, the ex-
pert's credibility and conclusions remain for the jury to assess, after
hearing the testimony and cross-examination.33
29. Id. at 593-94.
30. See id. at 597.
31. Actual publication would, of course, not be required. As the Court noted in
Daubert, "[p]ublication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of
admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with reliability." Id. at 593.
32. For a description of the peer review process of one of the leading scientific jour-
nals see The Journal's Peer Review Process, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 837 (1989).
33. Daubert recognized the important role of the adversary system's methods-in-
cluding "vigorous cross-examination [and the] presentation of contrary evidence"-in as-
sisting the jury to reach an accurate conclusion as to credibility of experts and weight to
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Judges may evaluate the basis for an expert's opinion as they
deem best. Consistent with Rule 7 06 ,4 they may appoint an outside
expert or a panel of such experts, as suggested by Justice Breyer in
his concurrence in Joiner.35 These experts mimic the function of the
peer reviewers of a scientific journal and allow judges to avoid taking
on the role of the scientist. In other cases, it may be sufficient for the
judges to review the report on their own.
If judges do not choose to review the foundational adequacy of
the evidence themselves, court-appointed scientists would then re-
spond to the expert's report. They would submit to the court their
critiques of the testimony's foundation, essentially scientific amicus
curiae briefs in support of or opposed to admission. These responses
would assist the trial judges in assessing the adequacy of the expert's
foundation. In accordance with Daubert,36 the judges and the review-
ers would not evaluate the expert's conclusions, only the foundation
on which they rest. Following Joiner,37 however, the judges could
scrutinize the report to ensure that the conclusions of the expert are
only those that follow logically from the data and methodology used.
This process would help judges evaluate whether the expert has
a reliable basis for a scientific opinion and would help expose any
weakness, incompleteness, inconsistency, or incoherence in the data
and analysis. The enhanced foundational approach simultaneously
puts both defendants and plaintiffs on notice of what they must be
prepared to provide and assures them that if they meet this standard,
they will have the chance to prove their case. Building on the legal
practices of discovery reports and amicus curiae briefs and borrowing
from science, the approach preserves the traditional complementary
roles of judge and jury.
Looking to science for guidance in trials where science is at issue
minimizes those situations in which the law's conclusions contradict
those of science and thus helps preserve the legitimacy of the legal
system as a source of social truth. The Supreme Court has charged
judges with protecting the credibility of the system in their role as
gatekeepers. Properly performed, this gatekeeping function helps
ensure that the courts will continue to provide society with accurate
resolutions to legal conflicts and that jury verdicts speak the truth.
be given to their conclusions. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
34. FED. R. EVID. 706.
35. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 520-21 (Breyer, J., concurring).
36. See Daubert, 503 U.S. at 595.
37. See Joiner, 118 S.Ct. at 519.
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